SRI LANKA'S LAWS
Legislation and the Emergency
Report by the Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers
9 September 1998
Report by the Centre for the Independence
of Judges and Lawyers
Chapter on Legislation & Emergency
9 September 1998

Summary of
Recommendations | Emergency
Regulations - the Statutory Framework | Detention under the
Emergency Regulations | Detention under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act | Publicity for Emergency
Regulations | Use of
Emergency Regulations for Non-emergency Purposes | The Indemnity Act | Confessions | Footnotes
Emergency Regulations - the Statutory Framework
....There has in effect been a civil war in Sri Lanka since 1983,
though except in the years 1987-90, this has mainly been confined to the north and east of
the island and to terrorist incidents in Colombo. In this Chapter, we look at the
framework of legislation which the government has relied on to combat its opponents, the
LTTE and other militant Tamil groups and the JVP.
The Government has relied mainly on Emergency Regulations made under
the Public Security Ordinance 1947 ...
Part I of the Ordinance confers on the President power to proclaim a
state of emergency in all a part of Sri Lanka if a public emergency exists or is imminent [12]. When an emergency has been proclaimed, Part II of the Ordinance confers on the President
power to make such Emergency Regulations as appear to her to be necessary or expedient in
the interests of public security and the preservation of public order and the suppression
of mutiny, riot or civil commotion, or for the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the life of the community [13]
Emergency Regulations may, among other things authorise the
detention of persons. [14] Emergency Regulations may
override existing laws [15] Neither the existence of
an emergency nor an emergency regulation nor an order, rule or direction made under such a
regulation may be called in question in any courts [16]
No action or prosecution lies against any person for any act in good faith done in
pursuance or supposed pursuance of an emergency regulation or an order or direction made
under it [17]
The Public Security Ordinance dates from 1946, just before
independence. It has been retained and given its present force by Article 155 of the 1978 Constitution (... as
amended by the 10th and 13th Amendments...). Emergency Regulations may override any
existing law except the Constitution itself. [18] The
proclamation of an emergency takes effect for one month and a further proclamation may be
made before or at the end of that period [19] A
proclamation has immediate effect but must be approved by Parliament within 14 days [20] When a proclamation is renewed, existing Emergency
Regulations are deemed to continue in force unless otherwise directed by the President. [21]
As mentioned in the last paragraph, Emergency Regulations can not
override the Constitution and, in particular, the provisions of Chapter III which confer fundamental rights. In
the context of the Emergency Regulations, the most important rights are those conferred by
Article 11 (freedom from torture) and Article 13(1)-(4) (freedom from arbitrary arrest,
detention and punishment). However, the rights declared by Articles 13(1) and (2) (freedom
from arbitrary arrest and detention) are, by virtue of Article 15(7), "subject to
such restrictions as may be prescribed by law in the interests of national security,
public order and the protection of public health or morality".
Before looking at the Emergency Regulations themselves, we must
comment on the legislative framework, about which we have some criticisms.
First, it is in our opinion wrong that the existence or imminence of a
state of emergency cannot be called in question in a court. [23] The proclamation of a state of emergency confers
extremely wide powers on the President. Those powers are much more easily abused than her
ordinary constitutional powers. While we believe that the President should have
considerable discretion in deciding whether or not a state of emergency exists, her
decision should at least be based on a rational belief that a state of emergency exists or
is imminent.
We therefore recommend that section 3 of the Public Security
Ordinance be amended to permit a proclamation under section 1 to be challenged in the
Supreme Court on the ground that there is no reason to believe that a state of emergency
exists or is imminent.
In making this recommendation, we acknowledge that a state of emergency
has in fact existed continuously since 1983. We have not
considered whether all of the earlier proclamations under the Ordinance were justified.
In our view, there is insufficient Parliamentary control over Emergency
Regulations. A limited degree of control is given by s. 5 (3) of the Public Security Ordinance, which provides that an
emergency regulation may be added to or altered or revoked by resolution of Parliament.[24] In addition, Articles 155 (5) and (6) of the Constitution
restrict the operation of a proclamation to a period of one month and require such a
proclamation to be approved by Parliament within a period of fourteen days. There is,
however, no requirement that new Emergency Regulations should be laid before Parliament
for approval. We regard this as unsatisfactory, particularly in view of the very
inadequate system (discussed in more detail below) for publicising changes in the
regulations. Even Members of Parliament may not be aware of new regulations.
We recommend that all new regulations, or new amendments to existing
regulations, should be required to be laid before Parliament for approval. Except in cases
of necessity, such regulations or amendments should not take effect until so approved.
We are concerned that section 8 of
the Public Security Ordinance provides that no emergency regulation shall be called in
question in any court. This section has not prevented the Supreme Court from exercising
its jurisdiction under Article 126 of the Constitution to protect the fundamental rights
set out in Chapter III of the Constitution as discussed below. We believe, however, that
there should be a wider power to challenge Emergency Regulations, on the ground (for
example) that there is no basis for the President's belief that a particular regulation is
necessary or expedient in the interests of public security.
We recommend that section 8 of the Public
Security Ordinance be repealed.
We are also concerned that section 9 of the Ordinance excludes civil or
criminal proceedings against any person for any act done in good faith in pursuance or
supposed pursuance of an emergency regulation. We believe that the test of liability
should be objective.
We recommend that so much of section 9 of the Public Security
Ordinance as excludes liability for acts done in good faith, but not in fact authorised by
Emergency Regulations in force for the time being, should be repealed.
We would accept the exclusion of liability for acts authorised by
Emergency Regulations subsequently held to be invalid.
The provisions of Article 15 of the Constitution which permit
restriction of the fundamental rights set out in Articles 12-14 are not tightly enough
drawn.
We recommend that any restriction of fundamental rights on the
grounds of national security should only have effect when a state of emergency has been
proclaimed and then only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation.[25]

Detention under the Emergency
Regulations
We now turn to the Emergency Regulations themselves. There are three
areas which need particular investigation. These are:
(i) the terms of the regulations, in particular in relation to powers
of detention
(ii) the problems of ascertaining what regulations are in force, and
(iii) the use of Emergency Regulations for purposes outside the scope
of the emergency.
At the date of the mission, a state of emergency was in force only in
Colombo, the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and adjoining districts. Between 4 April 1996
and 4 July 1997 the state of emergency had extended to the whole of the island. It was
suggested to us at one meeting that there was no need to extend the state of emergency to
Colombo, but (taking into account the bomb explosion in central Colombo in mid-October) we
believe the inclusion of Colombo and its suburbs is justifiable.
The main Emergency Regulations concerning detention were, at the date
of the mission, contained in the Emergency (Miscellaneous
Provisions and Powers) Regulations N° 4 of 1994 ("the principal
Regulations"). The principal Regulations have been amended from time to time...
Part II of the principal Regulations authorises three different kinds
of detention. These are:
(i) preventive detention, under regulation 17;
(ii) detention following arrest, under regulations 18
and 19; and
(iii) detention for rehabilitation, under regulations 20
and 22.
The Secretary of the Ministry of Defence may under Regulation 17 order
that a person may be detained in custody if he is satisfied that this is necessary to
prevent that person from acting in a manner prejudicial to national security or the
maintenance of public order or essential services, or from committing certain offences.
Such an order may be made for a period not exceeding three months, and may be renewed for
not more than three months at a time for a total period not exceeding a year.
Thereafter, detention may be continued if the detainee is produced
before a Magistrate, with a report from the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence setting
out the reasons for the detention and why it needs to be extended. Detention can be
ordered by the Magistrate for a period of not more than three months, and the order can be
renewed an unlimited number of times.[26] Any person
aggrieved by a detention order may present his objections before an Advisory Committee
appointed by the President; the Advisory Committee reports to the Secretary of the
Ministry of Defence, who may confirm or revoke the order. [27]
We were told by the Ministry of Defence that 885 new detention orders
under regulation 17 had been made between the beginning of 1996 and the date of our
mission. Of those orders, 525 were no longer in effect, the detainees having either been
released, transferred to the ordinary prison system following criminal charges, or become
the subject of Rehabilitation Orders. This leaves a balance of 360, together with any
detention orders made before 1 January 1996 and still in force.
Under regulation 18 any police officer or any member of the armed
forces may detain or arrest without warrant any person who is committing or has committed
or whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be concerned in, or to be committing
or to have committed, an offence under any emergency regulation. Any person arrested by a
member of the armed forces outside the Northern and Eastern Provinces must be handed over
to the police within 24 hours.[28] Arrests must be
reported within 24 hours to the Superintendent of Police of the Division or to the
commanding officer of the area.[29] When any person is
taken into custody under this regulation, the arresting officer must issue a
"receipt" to the spouse, father, mother, or other close relative of the detainee
acknowledging the fact of the arrest. [30]
A person arrested or detained under regulation 18 may be kept in
detention on an order made by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector
General or, in the case of arrests or detention by a member of the armed forces in the
Northern and Eastern provinces, by a senior officer of the armed forces. Detention must be
in a place authorised by the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. Detention is authorised
for a period of up to 60 days in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and up to 21 days
elsewhere. At the end of that period the detainee must be released, unless an order for
his preventive detention has been made or he has been remanded in custody by a court. [31] The officer in charge of an authorised place of
detention is required to provide the local Magistrate every 14 days with a list of the
detainees in that place, and the Magistrate is required to display the list on the notice
board of his court. [32] The Magistrate is required to
visit places of detention in his district at least once a month. [33]
We have no information about the number of people arrested and detained
under regulations 18 and 19. In any event, these figures are likely to fluctuate quite
rapidly.
Under regulation 20, a person detained under regulations 17 or 19 or
under the PTA may be detained for rehabilitation in the interests of
his own welfare, under a Rehabilitation Order made by the Minister of Defence or the
Secretary of the Ministry, in substitution for the previous form of detention. [34] Rehabilitation takes place in a Youth Development
and Training Centre. [35]
A different form of rehabilitation is provided under regulation 22.[36] When anyone voluntarily surrenders to the police or
armed forces "in connection with" various offences or "through fear of
terrorist activities", steps must be taken within 10 days to assign him to a
Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centre, where he is supposed to be provided
with appropriate training. [37] The Secretary to the
Ministry of Defence is required to order the detention of the surrendering person for a
period of up to 12 months, which may be extended for up to four further periods of three
months each. He must then be released, without prejudice to any criminal proceedings
against him. [38]
We were told [39] that applications
for detention orders which have to be approved by the Minister of Defence or the Secretary
of the Ministry are considered by a processing committee, which includes the Legal Adviser
to the Ministry and a member of the Attorney Generals Department and meets weekly.
Applications are submitted by the police or the Criminal Investigation Department. The
committee considers whether the applications comply with the Emergency Regulations or (as
the case may be) the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and if they are in
order submits them to the Secretary or the Minister.
Detention under the Emergency Regulations clearly contravenes Article 9 of the ICCPR .... It can
therefore be justified only in so far as the Government has validly derogated from its
obligations under Article 4 which permits derogation only "in times of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation,' and then only "to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation".
As we have said above, we are satisfied that a state of emergency
exists and that it is one which, within the meaning of Article 4, threatens the life of
the nation. However, the regulations go beyond what is strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, and there has been no sufficient derogation.
Preventive detention is a draconian power which can only be justified
in exceptional circumstances. We have concluded that the circumstances in the parts of Sri
Lanka covered by the Emergency Regulations are exceptional and that preventive detention
can not be ruled out in principle. However, we believe that a much greater degree of
judicial control is needed than is provided by regulation 17.
This is emphasised by Article 3 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, which requires the judiciary to have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial
nature.
We recommend
(i) that the initial preventive detention order made by the Secretary
of the Ministry of Defence must be confirmed by a Magistrate within a period of one month
(ii)that all subsequent renewals of the order must be made by a
Magistrate
(iii) that there should be a strict limit on the total duration of a
detention order
(iv) that the procedure for presenting objections to the Advisory
Committee be replaced by a proper and speedy system of appeal to a judicial body having
power to give binding directions.
We were told by the Attorney-General that, following the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in the Cooray case (discussed below), the making of preventive detention orders had
been suspended. A revised regulation 17 incorporating the safeguards required by the
Cooray decision may be introduced, but he thought it unlikely that it would be used. We
believe that the longer periods of detention authorised under regulation 19 following arrests in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces are not justified;
we recommend that the 21-day limit on detention under regulation 19
should be reduced to 7 days and apply to all districts subject to the Emergency
Regulations.
The provisions for the issue of "detention receipts", for
supplying magistrates with lists of detainees and posting those lists on notice boards,
and for monthly visits by magistrates to detention camps, have had a valuable effect in
helping to reduce the number of people who have "disappeared" following arrest.
However, we were told that magistrates were not ensuring that these obligations are
observed.
We recommend that steps be taken to ensure that magistrates receive
lists of detainees, post them on the court notice boards, and visit detention camps in
their districts as required by the regulations.
It appears that only a relatively small number of people are detained
for rehabilitation. On 1 January 1997, there were 186 people detained for rehabilitation,
155 of them under regulation 20 and 31 under regulation 22.[42]
We were told that, as at 14 September 1997, the number detained for rehabilitation was
118.[43] We heard little criticism of rehabilitation
orders under regulation 20. However,
we recommend that Rehabilitation Orders should be made by courts and
not by the Minister or the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and that Orders under
regulation 20 should be limited to two years.
In practice, we understand that very few orders are made for a longer
period.
Rehabilitation Orders under regulation 22
were more severely criticised, on the basis that there is no reason why those who
surrender voluntarily should automatically be required to serve a period of
rehabilitation. We agree, and believe that the other powers of detention are adequate to
cover the cases where detention is appropriate.
We recommend that regulation 22 be repealed.
The Emergency Regulations do not prescribe minimum standards for the
conditions in which detainees are kept.
We recommend that the Emergency Regulations should prescribe minimum
standards for conditions of detention which should comply with the Body of Principles for
the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment adopted by the
UN General Assembly.

Detention under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act
Detention is also authorised under Part III
of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, N° 48 of
1979 ("the PTA"). ...
Where the Minister of Defence has reason to believe or suspect that any
person is connected with or concerned in any "unlawful activity", she may order
that the person may be detained for a period not exceeding three months' renewable for
further three month periods up to a maximum of 18 months.[44]
The Minister may, alternatively, make an order for similar periods imposing restrictions
falling short of detention, such as house arrest or curfew, travel restrictions,
restriction of activities as a member of an organisation, and restrictions on addressing
public meetings or holding political office.[45]
Orders of either kind are stated to be final and not to be
called in question in any court or tribunal.[46]
This provision can not, however, exclude the constitutional power of the Supreme Court to
exercise its fundamental rights jurisdiction. Any person against whom an order has been
made may make representations to an Advisory Board [47]
[which is, in practice, the same body as the Advisory Committee set up under the emergency
regulations). Detention is in such place and subject to such conditions as may be
determined by the Minister.
We were told by the Ministry of Defence that 99 new detention orders
had been made under the PTA between the beginning of 1996 and the date of our mission. Of
those, 42 were no longer in force, leaving a balance of 57. As detention under the PTA is
limited to 18 months, no earlier orders could remain in force.
There are many differences between the power of detention under the PTA
and the power of preventive detention under the Emergency Regulations - for example, the
fact that an order under the PTA must be made by the Minister rather than by the
Secretary, and that there is a maximum duration for orders under the PTA. Perhaps the most
important distinction at the present time is that the PTA power continues to apply to the
whole of Sri Lanka, whereas the Emergency Regulations apply only to part of it. It is
confusing and, in our view, unnecessary to have two separate and parallel powers of
detention. Furthermore, the making of a detention order under the PTA at a time when no
proclamation of a state of emergency is in force in the relevant part of Sri Lanka
involves a contravention of Article 9 of the
ICCPR which is incapable of being the subject of a derogation.
We recommend that the powers of detention under the PTA should be
abolished or, failing that, made subject to the same restrictions as we have proposed
above for the power of preventive detention under the Emergency Regulations; in particular
(i) the initial order should be subject to confirmation by a court, and
renewals should be ordered by a court
(ii) there should be a right of appeal against a detention order to a
judicial body
(iii) no order can be made except when and where a state of emergency
is in force, and
(iv) minimum standards for conditions of detention should be
prescribed.
The power to make an order for a form of restriction falling short of
detention might, at first sight, seem more acceptable than a power of detention. However,
this is not necessarily the case. The very fact that restrictions do not have such serious
consequences as detention may make it easier for a government to abuse the power to make
restriction orders. In fact the power to make restriction orders appears to have been very
little used and we received no comments about them, either in interviews or written
material.
We recommend that the power under the PTA to make restriction orders
should be reviewed and that, unless a clear case for retention can be made out, the power
should be repealed.
As in the case of the Public Security Ordinance,
we recommend that the exclusion of liability for acts done in good
faith, but not in fact authorised by the PTA, should be repealed.
"Unlawful activity'' is defined by the PTA, as amended in 1982, as
including any act committed prior to the date of passing of the PTA which act would, if
committed after such date, constitute an offence under the PTA. We believe this to be a
clear breach of Article 15 of the ICCPR,
which prohibits retrospective criminal legislation and is not derogable. In view of the
fact that the practical operation of this provision must by now be spent we do not
formally recommend a change in the definition, but we wish to draw attention to its
impropriety.
Section 7 of the PTA requires the courts to order the remand in custody
of persons arrested on suspicion of "unlawful activity". This deprives the court
of the discretion to grant bail. "Unlawful activity" includes the commission of
any offence under the PTA. Some of those offences - for example, defacing a street sign -
are quite trivial. In such cases the exclusion of bail is wholly inappropriate. We were
told that the absence of a right to bail leads to extensive plea-bargaining. Persons
charged, for example, under section 5 of the PTA with failing to give information to the
police will often plead guilty and receive a suspended sentence rather than remain in
custody pending a contested trial.
We recommend that section 7 of the PTA be amended so as to allow the
courts to grant bail except in the most serious cases....

Publicity for Emergency Regulations
Publicity for Emergency Regulations is very inadequate. As already
mentioned, Emergency Regulations come into effect immediately upon being made and do not
have to be laid before Parliament. We have recommended above that all Emergency
Regulations should be laid before Parliament for approval and, except in extreme
situations, should not come into effect until so approved. This would at least enable
Members of Parliament to inform themselves of emergency legislation.
This alone, however, would be inadequate. Emergency Regulations are
published in the official Gazette. However, the Gazette has a very limited circulation.
The quantity of emergency legislation is very large and it changes constantly. There is no
proper system of numbering, listing or indexing the regulations. An independent human
rights organisation, the Nadesan Centre for Human Rights
through Law, provides an invaluable service in monitoring the Gazette and notifying
subscribers of changes in the regulations. However, this should not be left to a private
organisation.
We recommend
(i) that all new Emergency Regulations and amendments and rescissions
of existing regulations, should be published in Sinhala, Tamil and English language
newspapers circulating throughout the areas under the control of the Government
(ii) that the Government should prepare and keep updated and indexed a
collection of the Emergency Regulations for the time being in force which would be
accessible to the public; as soon as possible this should take the form of a computer
database which could be accessed on the internet.

Use of Emergency Regulations
for Non-emergency Purposes
Emergency Regulations are sometimes very wide in scope, and enter into
fields which do not have any very obvious connection with the emergency; it is hard to
see, for instance, what relevance to the emergency the Emergency (Games of Chance)
(Jack-pot) Regulation N° 1 of 1995 can have. More seriously, there are some cases in
which the Government appears to have been trying to use Emergency Regulations as a
short-cut to avoid the need for primary legislation in relation to matters which have no
real connection with the emergency. A particularly serious example was the Emergency
(Generation of Electrical Power and Energy) Regulation N° 1 of 1997. The effect of this
regulation was to remove the application of existing environmental protection legislation
from the generation of power and energy. The motive for this, it is believed, was the
Governments wish to construct a particular new power station without having to
comply with the legislation. As a result of public pressure the regulation was rescinded
by the Government after about three months.
We believe that abuses of this kind could be prevented by
adopting our recommendation, made above, for the repeal of section 8 of the Public
Security Ordinance. This would enable Emergency Regulations to be challenged in
the courts on the basis that they could not reasonably be regarded as necessary or
expedient for the purposes authorised by the Ordinance.

The Indemnity Act
We have already referred to provisions in the Public Security Ordinance
and the PTA which exclude civil and criminal liability for certain acts done "in good
faith". In addition, the Indemnity Act of 1982, as
amended by the Indemnity (Amendment) Act of 1988, excludes
civil and criminal liability "for or on account of or in respect of any act, matter
or thing . . . done or purported to be done with a view to restoring law and order during
the period August 1, 1977 to [16 December 1988], if done in good faith" by a person
holding government office (including the police and the armed forces) or acting under the
authority of such an office-holder.
This Act was not raised with us as an issue during our mission, perhaps
because any acts covered by it must have been at least nine years old. In any event, the
incidents which have caused particular concern involve acts which could not by any stretch
of the imagination be described as having been done in good faith. However, legislation of
this kind giving retrospective immunity from suit or prosecution for unlawful acts is in
our view wholly unjustifiable. Even though the Act now has little practical importance, it
should not remain on the statute book.
We recommend that the Indemnity Act be repealed.

Confessions
The normal rule in Sri Lanka is that confessions to police officers are
not admissible in evidence; confessions are only admissible if made before a Magistrate.
Confessions to police officers are suspect because of widespread
use of torture. However, confessions to a police officer of the rank of Assistant
Superintendent or above are admissible on the trial of offences both under the Emergency
Regulations [58] and under the PTA. [59]
We believe that the admissibility of confessions in such cases
encourages the use of torture and that such confessions cannot be regarded as reliable. We
were told that in many cases the courts have in fact refused to admit confessions made to
police officers on the ground that they were not made voluntarily.
We recommend that the ordinary rules as to the admissibility of
confessions should apply to the trial of offences under Emergency Regulations or the PTA.

Summary of Recommendations
We recommend
1. that section 3 of the Public Security Ordinance be amended to
permit a proclamation under section 1 to be challenged in the Supreme Court on the ground
that there is no reason to believe that a state of emergency exists or is imminent.
2. that all new regulations, or new amendments to existing regulations, should be
required to be laid before Parliament for approval. Except in cases of necessity, such
regulations or amendments should not take effect until so approved.
3. that section 8 of the Public Security Ordinance be
repealed.
4. that so much of section 9 of the Public Security Ordinance as excludes liability for
acts done in good faith, but not in fact authorised by Emergency Regulations in force for
the time being, should be repealed.
5. that any restriction of fundamental rights on the grounds of national security
should only have effect when a state of emergency has been proclaimed and then only to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.
6. that the initial preventive detention order
made by the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence must be confirmed by a Magistrate within
a period of one month; that all subsequent renewals of the order must be made by a
Magistrate; that there should be a strict limit on the total duration of a detention order
; that the procedure for presenting objections to the Advisory Committee be replaced
by a proper and speedy system of appeal to a judicial body having power to give binding
directions.
7. that the 21-day limit on detention under regulation 19 should be
reduced to 7 days and apply to all districts subject to the Emergency Regulations.
8. that steps be taken to ensure that magistrates
receive lists of detainees, post them on the court notice boards, and visit detention
camps in their districts as required by the regulations.
9. that Rehabilitation Orders should be made by courts and not by the
Minister or the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and that Orders under regulation 20
should be limited to two years.
10. that regulation 22 be repealed.
11. that the Emergency Regulations should
prescribe minimum standards for conditions of detention which should comply with the Body
of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment adopted by the UN General Assembly.
12. that the powers of detention under the PTA
should be abolished or, failing that, made subject to the same restrictions as we
have proposed above for the power of preventive detention under the Emergency Regulations;
in particular - (i) the initial order should be subject to confirmation by a court, and
renewals should be ordered by a court - (ii) there should be a right of appeal against a
detention order to a judicial body - (iii) no order can be made except when and where a
state of emergency is in force, and - (iv) minimum standards for conditions of detention
should be prescribed.
13. that the power under the PTA to make
restriction orders should be reviewed and that, unless a clear case for retention can be
made out, the power should be repealed.
14. that the exclusion of liability for acts done in good faith, but
not in fact authorised by the PTA, should be repealed.
15. that section 7 of the PTA be amended so as to allow the courts to
grant bail except in the most serious cases....
16. that all new Emergency Regulations and amendments and rescissions
of existing regulations, should be published in Sinhala, Tamil and English language
newspapers circulating throughout the areas under the control of the Government
17, that the Government should prepare and keep updated and indexed a
collection of the Emergency Regulations for the time being in force which would be
accessible to the public; as soon as possible this should take the form of a computer
database which could be accessed on the internet.
18. that the Indemnity Act be repealed.
19. that the ordinary rules as to the
admissibility of confessions should apply to the trial of offences under Emergency
Regulations or the PTA.
Foot notes
- 12 Public Security
Ordinance, s. 2 (1 ).
- 13 ibid,s.5(l).
- 14 ibid, s. 5 (2) (a).
- 15 ibid, s. 7.
- 16 ibid, ss. 3, 8.
- 17 ibid,s.9.
- 18 Article 155 (2)
- 19 Article 155 (5).
- 20 Article 155 (6), (8)
- 21 Public Security
Ordinance, s. 2 (2A), inserted by the Public Security (Amendment) Act, No 28 of 1988.
- 23 Public Security Ordinance,
s. 3.
- 24 This power has apparently never been exercised.
- 25 See Article 4.1 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
- 26 The Emergency (Miscellaneous
Provision and Powers) Regulation, No 4 of 1994, reg. 17 (1)
- 27 ibid, reg. 17 (5) - (11).
- 28 ibid, reg. 18 (1).
- 29 ibid, reg. 18 (7).
- 30 ibid, reg. 18 (8).
- 31 ibid, reg. 19 (2), as amended by Gazette 928/11 of 19 June
1996; reg. 19 (9).
- 32 ibid, reg. 19 (5).
- 33 ibid, reg. 19 (6).
- 34 ibid, reg. 20 (1).
- 35 ibid. reg. 21(2).
- 36 As substituted by Gazette 938/13 of 29 August 1996.
- 37 ibid, reg. 22 (1) - (5).
- 38 ibid, reg. 22 (6), (8) - (10).
- 39 Interview with the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Defence
- 42 Letter of 10 February 1997 from the Commissioner General of
Rehabilitation to the Nadesan Centre.
- 43 Interview with the Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Defence;
no breakdown given between detentions under regulations 20 and 22.
- 44 Prevention of Terrorism Act, s. 9 (1)
- 45 ibid, s. 11 (1).
- 46 ibid, ss. 10, 11 (5).
- 47 ibid, s. 13
- 58 Emergency (Miscellaneous Provisions and Powers) Regulations,
reg. 49
- 59 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary
Provisions) Act, s. 16.
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